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Abstract 
This thesis examines the question of organization, governance and choice of seeds 
in Swedish agriculture. It consists of four papers: Paper I investigates the evolution 
of plant breeding industry in Sweden. The results suggest that the establishment of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) schemes creates power in the seed value chain in 
Sweden and has therefore been a major driver of mergers and acquisitions, together 
with changes in domestic agricultural policy as well the country´s entrance to EU. 
Based on nationwide survey among farmers, papers II and III examine the impact of 
IPRs and specifically the implications of the enforcement of Plant Breeders Rights 
on farmers´ choice between certified versus farm saved seed (FSS). Paper II uses 
transaction cost theory and logistics regression to examine empirically the 
governance structure of farmers choosing certified or FSS. Farmers´ assessment of 
the quality seed in terms of the genetic purity of each channel has no impact on their 
choice while personal relations with their upstream partners, investments in the farm 
as well as delivery contracts affect their procurement strategy. In paper III, spatial 
autoregressive models are used in order to analyze the transfer of “know-how” 
between farmers, and the spillover effects of social learning in farmers´ choice of 
seed channel. Farmers are distinguished between neighbors, based on their relative 
distance; and peers, based on membership in farmers’ cooperatives. The results 
indicate the existence of spatial dependence on Swedish farmers’ choice of seed 
channel. Paper IV evaluates the impact of farmers’ social networks on their decision 
to be involved in the governance of the agricultural cooperative. The findings 
suggest a relationship between network characteristics and farmers’ involvement in 
the governance that persists over a long period.  
Keywords: seed systems, intellectual property rights, transaction cost theory, 
Bayesian econometrics, social networks, cooperative governance, cooperatives  
Author’s address: Chrysa Morfi, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
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1.1 Thesis overview  
This thesis covers issues related to organisation and governance of agri-food 
systems with emphasis on seed systems. Seed is the only physical matter 
with the ability to duplicate itself which is subject to Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs). IPRs affect not only the evolution of the plant breeding 
industry but also farmers´ seed choices. Hypothetically, if a holder of a 
smartphone could plant the phone and harvest more smartphones in 
subsequent periods, there would be a series of questions to be asked. Who is 
the owner of the second generation smartphones; the tech-phone company 
who invested in the embedded and protected technology or the user? Who 
decides who the owner is? Should the user pay for the use of the second 
period smartphones? Will the user repurchase new smartphones or will she 
continue using the second period phones? Will her peers and neighbors affect 
her choice? This thesis attempts to provide answers to some of these 
questions in the context of seed.  
Paper I reviews the evolution of plant breeding in Sweden and the impact 
of IPRs on the development of the industry. Papers II and II examine farmers´ 
choice of seed and specifically the choice between certified and farm saved 
seed (FSS). The use of FSS not only can push the prices of the formal seed 
system down, it can also act as a parallel seed channel safeguarding the stock 
of seed input required for the domestic agricultural production. Additionally, 
as more and more patents on widely adopted varieties are expiring, 
understanding farmers´ preferences and behaviors towards these two seed 
channel becomes increasingly relevant. Papers III and IV examine the link 
between social networks embedded in cooperative membership in relation to 
1. Introduction 
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farmers’ seed choices and farmers’ involvement in the governance of their 
cooperative. In Sweden, the cooperative movement has a long history and 
has helped the country transformed to a highly industrialized country. Table 
1 provides an overview of the papers examined.  
Table 1. Overview of the papers included in the thesis 
No. Title Aim Keywords 
I The wizards of Svalöf; 
Intellectual property 
rights and consolidation 
in plant breeding industry. 
To map the evolution of 
plant breeding industry in 
Sweden. 
biotechnology, UPOV, 
seed industry, seed 
system, value chain 
II Save or buy? Insights 
from farmers’ choice of 
seed input. 
To examine farmers 
choice of seed input; why 
some farmers opt for 
certified and others for 
FSS.  
transaction cost theory, 
trust, seed perception, 
IPRs 
III Spatial Seeds; Peer and 
neighbor effects on 
farmers’ choice of seed 
channel. 
To investigate how 
farmers affect each other 
in their choice of seed 
channel as well as impact 
of perceptions about IPRs 
and cooperative 
membership. 
spatial econometrics, 
Bayesian econometrics, 
seed systems, 
intellectual property 
rights, cooperative 
membership  
IV Social networks and 
cooperative members’ 
willingness to be elected 
representatives. 
To explore the impact of 
social networks on 
farmers’ willingness to be 
elected representatives 
and their involvement 
with the governance of 
their cooperative 
board of directors, 
social capital, 
nomination committee, 
cooperative 
governance 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as it follows; two additional 
subchapters in the introduction provide general information about the 
agricultural sector in Sweden as well the domestic formal (certified) and 
informal (FSS) seed supply chain. Chapter two reviews the two main IPRs 
regimes and their economic implications as well as the literature conducted 
related to farmers´ seed choices. Chapter three attempts to provide an 
overarching perspective of the papers included in the thesis. Information 
17 
about the data used in the analysis of the papers can be found in chapter four. 
Section five discusses the main findings of the papers and it is followed by 
the last chapter which consists of the summaries of the appended papers.   
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1.2 Swedish agriculture in numbers and figures 
Sweden has three million hectares of land available for agriculture, of which 
two and a half million hectares are cropland. About 40% of the country’s 
cropland is allocated to the production of cereals which corresponds to 1.8% 
of the total EU(28) land for cereal production. Sweden has a share of 5.5% 
in EU’s fodder and forage production and 2.2% of the union’s dry pulses 
(Eurostat, 2016). Approximately twenty thousand hectares are allocated for 
the production of fresh vegetables and berries while two thousands hectares 
are used for the production of fruits (Eurostat, 2016).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, the acreage of agricultural land and cropland 
has decreased during the past decades; in 1961 the land for agricultural 
production amounted to 4.2 million hectares. This corresponds to 
approximately 30% loss of agricultural land in the past seven decades. Much 
agricultural land has been turned into forestland in the northern and 
mountainous parts of the country, especially after the national agricultural 
policy was abolished in 1990 whereby the financial support to farmers in 
disadvantaged areas decreased.  
Figure 1. Agricultural land and cropland area in Sweden during 1961-2017 (in 1000 ha). 
Source: FAOSTAT (2020)  
The number of agricultural holdings has decreased by nearly 4,000 in 2013 
compared to 2010. This corresponds to a 6% decrease; from 71,091 holdings 
in 2010 to 67,146 three years later. The declining trend has been ongoing for 
decades (Eurostat, 2017). Figure 2 displays the distribution of holdings and 
utilized agricultural area (UAA) in 2013. The figure shows that larger units 
(with 100 ha UAA and more) cultivate more than half of the country´s UAA. 
Approximately 1150 holdings are involved in the production of certified 
seed.  
0
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Figure 2. Number of holdings and utilized agriculture area by UAA size classes, 2013 
(%). Source: Eurostat (2017) 
Cereals have historically been one of the biggest crops in terms of production 
volume. The most common cereal crop is wheat with almost half a million 
hectares grown, followed by barley and oats. The share of land allocated to 
the production of different crops has been relatively steady the past 40 years. 
An explanation to the negative trend in some crops (see Figure 3) is the fact 
that less productive agricultural land has turned into forestland. 
Figure 3. Filed areas for selected crops in Sweden 1981-2019 (in 1000 ha). 
Source: SBA (2020) 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 display the annual production volume and 
corresponding yields for selected crops respectively. Both figures display 
notable annual fluctuations with a drastic change in the year 2018 when 
Swedish agriculture experienced a dramatic loss of production due to the 
extreme warm and dry summer. 
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Figure 4. Production volume for selected corps in Sweden (in 1000 tones).  
Source: SBA (2020) 
 
Figure 5. Yields for selected crops in Sweden (in kg per hectare). Source: SBA (2020) 
Figure 6 illustrates area grown for specific crops for the production of 
certified seed. The arable acreage for the production of seed for cereals 
fluctuates with a negative trend. Arable areas for the production of oilseeds 
and pulses has been steady since 1997 while the area for forage corps almost 
doubled during the same period.  
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Barley Forage Oats Rapeseed Triticale Wheat
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Barley Forage Oats Rapeseed Triticale Wheat
21 
Figure 6. Field production area for seed for aggregated species in Sweden 1997-2019 (in 
ha). Source: ESCAA (2020) 
1.3 Seed supply chain1 
The term seed supply chain refers to all the actors involved and the processes 
required before a farmer can obtain the most valuable input from the formal 
seed markers. Even though in most countries, including Sweden, this chain 
is highly integrated, two industries can be distinguished, namely plant 
breeding and seed production. This distinction is based on the objective of 
each industry. Plant breeders aim to develop new varieties or to improve 
existing ones while seed producers aim to multiply and market the final 
product. Figure 7 describes the major stages involved in the production, 
processing and distribution of seed. 
1 The information provided in this section is based on a working paper  (Morfi and Karantininis, 2018). The data 
used for the analysis are collected mostly via interviews, governmental reports as well as additional anecdotal 
sources.   
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Figure 7: Steps and processes involved in plant breeding and seed production 
1.3.1 Pre-breeding and plant breeding 
The term plant breeding refers to the upper part of the chain (Figure 7) and 
it includes fundamental and applied research which are often referred to with 
the term pre-breeding. Pre-breeding can be described as genetics and 
mathematical statistics combined with plant physiology, and (bio)chemical 
analysis, supplemented by a number of molecular biological concepts and 
techniques in plant breeding (Louwaars et al., 2009, p.9). Thus, pre breeding 
-the link between genetic resources and breeding programs- is an essential
part of plant breeding. Generally, the term refers to all processes and
activities leading to germplasm domestication but it is not uncommon for
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pre-breeding programs to include research on the development of breeding 
methods for the shortening of the breeding process. 
There are four primary stages in plant breeding: i) development of product 
concept and formation of the breeding objective; ii) creation and/or 
management of genetic variation; iii) selection; and iv) testing, risk 
assessment and finalization of the variety for the market. 
The process starts when the breeder determines the breeding objective: a 
new improved variety, which will exhibit specific traits with one or even 
more purposes such as higher yield, improved quality, disease and insect 
resistance, changes in agronomic characteristics, etc. Once the breeding 
objective is determined, the breeder searches for parental plants with the 
desired traits. In doing this, the breeder selects promising genes, from the 
available genetic resources (gene bank accessions, segregating populations, 
forward/reverse genetic systems). There are several ways to create genetic 
variation. The most common approach is by making artificial and deliberate 
crosses selected for specific traits. Another method is the use of artificially 
induced mutations or changes in the DNA sequence of the plant (Ceccarelli 
et al., 2009). Introduction of germplasm, which is the genetically distinct 
variants of a species, is also a primary source of variation (Suslow et al., 
2002).  
The breeders’ own stock, genetic stock developed by other firms, 
genebanks and in situ locations are some of the most common sources for 
breeders to obtain access to genetic stock and native or genetically modified 
traits, in order to generate genetic variability (Smith et al., 2016). This means 
that a breeder - or more accurately a breeding company- depends at least 
partially on development and genetic stock owned by competitive firms.  
Through selection, the breeder aims to utilize and narrow down the large 
diversity of breeding materials to a number of lines which best exhibit the 
desired combination of traits. There are various techniques for selection 
depending on the mating system of the crop (self-pollinating, cross-
pollinating, vegetative multiplication) and the selected traits. Conventional 
selection, marker assisted selection and genetic engineering are three broad 
ways for selecting plants with the best genetic make-up. In conventional 
selection, the breeder develops the new variety, commonly by using the 
germplasm directly or incorporating it into already existing varieties. The 
techniques that are used in Sweden to improve germplasm for the 
development of commercial varieties are conventional and marker assisted 
24 
selection. So far, genetic engineering in breeding programs is used in 
academic institutions for research purposes. 
1.3.2 Processes related to production of certified seed in Sweden 
Once the breeding activities have been successfully completed, the variety 
release processes begins. The term “variety release” refers to all decisions, 
procedures and actions required from the moment a breeder develops a new 
variety until that time when the variety is available for commercialization. 
Sweden, as member state of the EU, must comply with the European 
regulations on seed and plant propagating material. The EU requirements can 
be classified in four categories: 
i. Registration of the variety in a national or EU list
ii. Certification and inspections which aim to safeguard the quality of
marketed seed
iii. Marketing regulations (seed classification, homogeneity of lots,
packaging, sealing)
iv. Equivalence of seed harvested outside EU with seed harvested inside
EU with respect to quality criteria.
The above standards are translated into several stages and activities along the 
chain of seed production. The Swedish Board of Agriculture (SBA), in 
accordance with the EU Directives, states that in order to be permitted to sell 
seed and other propagating material of regulated agricultural plant and 
vegetables species, the varieties must be approved/registered and follow 
specific requirements2 
First, a decision must be made on the terms of the variety release; how to 
proceed in the multiplication stage and launch the new variety into the 
market(s). Not all varieties are released by the breeder or the variety owner. 
The breeder might decide to apply for PBR in specific territories and select 
another company as their successor for other states. Alternatively, the 
breeder can decide to apply for Community Plant Variety Rights which cover 
the wider EU territory. This is a common feature of the seed sector in many 
countries. The organization that owns the rights of a variety can reach an 
agreement with another party, in order to allow production and/or 
distribution of plant materials, especially in cases where the owner company 
2 EU Directives on marketing of fodder plants (66/401/EEC), beet seed (2002/54/EC), seed of oil and fibre plants 
(2002/55/EC) are incorporated in SBA statute SJVFS 2016:46. EU Directive (Directive 66/402/EC) on 
marketing of cereal seeds is implemented through statute SJVFS 2016:21. 
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cannot reach the market in a satisfactory way through existing market 
channel.   
There are two types of licenses: distribution license that gives the licensee 
the right to market and sell the variety; and production license which in 
addition to distribution rights, includes the right to multiply and produce seed 
(Nilsson, 2007). Typically, when the involved parties agree upon the terms 
and conditions of the release of the variety, the multiplication procedures 
begin. However, there is always the possibility for the breeder, to proceed 
with both multiplication and marketing of the seed, when the breeder has 
expanded the scope of its business operation (vertical integration). In 
Sweden, the agricultural cooperative Lantmännen is an example of a fully 
integrated system. The parties involved must also reach an agreement 
regarding the exclusivity of the rights. A common practice is the licensee to 
be granted exclusive rights when the organization undertakes the cost of 
registrations (VCU and DUS testing).  
Once the breeder decides how to reach a specific market, the new variety 
must be submitted for official testing in order to be granted Plant Variety 
Rights and to be registered in a National or Community List of Plant 
Varieties. The applicant should have a sufficient amount of genetically 
uniform and stable pure seed (nucleus seed) which will be later used for 
technical examination and further multiplication. An applicant can 
alternatively decide to submit a variety for testing at another EU authority, 
assuming that the submission fees and costs of testing are significantly lower 
than in Sweden. 
For a variety to be eligible for the protection, it has to establish that is new 
and i) distinct from other existing varieties; ii) uniform in its characteristics 
within the population; and iii) stable, meaning that maintains the same 
characteristics after successive stages of multiplication. The above test 
(DUS), is run in accordance with the Community Plant Variety Office 
(CPVO) guidelines where it is determined what morphological 
characteristics should be tested and how. The technical examination is 
carried out by examination offices appointed by the CPVO Council, after 
considering the geographical origin of the variety, the country of the 
applicant, the practical experience of the examination office and the opinion 
of the breeder. The examination office in Sweden is responsible for DUS 
testing in sugar beets. If the results from the trials are satisfactory and the 
variety meets the requirements, the official committees register the variety 
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in the national or EU variety list and exclusive marketing rights are granted 
for a period of 25 to 30 years. Plant Variety Protection rights cannot be 
renewed or prolonged.  
Registration in the national or EU variety lists aims to safeguard the 
quality of the varieties released in the national or common EU market. For a 
variety to be admitted in these lists it has to be submitted for DUS testing 
and meet specific standards on its Value for Cultivations and Use (VCU test). 
The aim of the VCU test is to assist farmers in the selection of varieties; 
farmers should not be dependent on promotion activities of breeders but 
rather on an independent comparison of agronomic characteristics such as 
yield and quality among different varieties. This test ensures that a new 
variety is better in one or more of its characteristics than the varieties already 
existing in the Swedish or common EU catalogue. What VCU test typically 
examines is field attributes such as yield, resistance to common plant 
deceases and time of maturity. It also provides an assessment of the quality 
of the seed after harvesting. The duration of this test is 2 to 3 years and SLU 
is the responsible agency. 
Registration at the national or common EU variety list does not grant 
Plant Variety Protection, hence doesn’t secure the legal rights of the owner. 
Similarly, PVP is an intellectual property protection system. Like any other 
protection scheme, owning the rights of a plant variety does not imply that is 
legal to propagate and market the variety. Thus, registration of the variety on 
the PVP cannot substitute registration on the national/EU variety list and vice 
versa. For conservation varieties and amateur varieties different regulations 
are applied3.  
Multiplication is the intermediate stage where the new genetic material is 
transitioning from laboratories and research farms towards the final 
destination: agricultural use. The process of seed multiplication begins with 
the decision of an organization, to multiply the seed of a variety in order to 
launch it on the market or license it out to another organization. In some 
cases, the multiplication phase begins when the variety is still under official 
testing. The initial amount of pure seed is multiplied through various classes 
and stages and classified from higher to lower grade, based on classification 
scale provided by SBA.  
                                                     
3 Statute of approving the conservation varieties of agricultural plant species and on the production and marketing 
of seed of such varieties (SJVFS 2016:18), Statute of conservation varieties and amateur varieties of vegetable 
species (SJVFS 2016:17). 
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The genetic and physical purity of breeders and pre-basic seed is 100%. 
The multiplication procedures of the first three classes are usually taking 
place in laboratories and research farms. In Sweden, Lantmännen is typically 
engaging seed growers in two cycles of multiplication stages, where the first 
cycle is characterized by higher seed purity and offers a higher profit margin 
for the farmer however, farmers cannot chose which cycle of the 
multiplication stage they will enter. Seed companies base their decision upon 
assessment of the capability of each grower to deliver clean and non-
germinated seed. During this time, growers are inspected (field controls) to 
verify the compliance with certification guidelines.  
Once the seed is collected from the farm, it is transported to facilities 
where it is subjected to moisture testing, drying, pre-cleaning, fine-cleaning, 
sorting, treatment, and packaging. Some growers have invested in seed 
facilities thus cleaning and drying can be performed at the farm level. During 
this time the sampling and labelling, the next steps of certification processes 
takes place. 
Certification is one of the main EU marketing requirements: only seed 
that has been certified can be sold within EU. The aim of certification is to 
guarantee the identity, health and quality of seeds before entering the market. 
The certification process includes pre-harvest as well as post-harvest 
procedures such as field inspections, sampling, testing and analysis, labelling 
and packaging. The certification criteria at the crop level usually are based 
on the farms’ cropping history, the minimum distances from neighboring 
pollen resources and the potential presence of harmful organisms. The 
criteria at the seed level include controls of the identity and purity of the 
variety, germination rate, content of seed of other plant species and presence 
of harmful organisms. 
Field inspections and sampling are conducted either by SBA personnel or 
by an authorized person, provided that this person has education in 
agricultural science and has successfully completed a course offered by SBA. 
SBA proceeds with random control of at least 5% of the crops that have been 
inspected or sampled by authorized personnel. What is typically controlled 
during field inspections for most species is the cropping history of the seed 
field, the appropriate distance and isolation from other species and/or 
varieties when necessary, and the presence of weeds and wild oats. The 
objective of sampling is to obtain a sample of a size suitable for tests, in 
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which the probability of a constituent being present is determined only by its 
level of occurrence in the seed lot. 
The aim of testing and analysis is to determine the health of the sample 
and by inference the health of the seed lot. The analysis is operated by the 
seed unit of SBA or by Frökontrollen Mellansverige AB. Alternatively, a 
seed company can use an authorized by SBA laboratory to conduct the 
analysis. In this case, SBA randomly controls at least 5% of the examined 
seed sample. What is typically examined is the varietal purity and identity, 
the accepted level of which varies from one crop to another.  
The last steps in the certification process are labelling and sealing 
processes. Once the seed has been controlled by the certification authority 
and the quality, health, identity and purity of the seed has been verified, the 
seed can be packaged and labelled in accordance with the national regulation 
and finally reach the market.  
1.3.3 Plant breeders and producers of seed borne plants in Sweden 
Lantmännen, MariboHilleshög Research AB, Secobra, Findus and Svalöf 
Consulting are the main breeders focusing crop varieties of seed-borne  
plants. Additionally, Sveaskog, Holmen, Stora Enso and Bergvik Skog focus 
on tree breeding and SLU at apples and berries. 
Lantmännen is one of the largest groups within the food, energy, and 
agricultural industries in the Nordic region. It is a cooperative organization 
owned by approximately 20,000 Swedish farmers. Initially co-owner of the 
breeding organization Svalöf AB, which was later merged with Weibull AB 
and formulated SW Seed. This subsidiary was integrated in Lantmännen’s 
agricultural operations in 2011. Currently Lantmännen owns breeding 
programs in winter wheat, oats, barley, triticale, summer rape and willow. 
The cooperative employs three breeding stations; two in Sweden (Svalöf, 
Lännas) and one in the Netherlands (Emmeloord). Svalöf station focus on 
breeding of spring barley, wheat, oats, spring rape, forage grass and salix. 
Lännas station focuses on spring barley and fodder legumes and the breeding 
station in Emmeloord on potatoes and triticale. 
Secobra is a French breeding company, which acquired the spring barley 
program for the southern Sweden from SW Seed during autumn 2014. The 
company operates based on service contractd with personnel from 
Lantmännen. Svalöf Consulting runs a breeding program on turning rape 
(Brassica Rapa). Maribo Hilleshög, former Syngenta SE, has its origins in 
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Hilleshög AB. The company was established in 1907 focusing on breeding 
of sugar beets. Most varieties of certified sugar beet in Sweden are bred at 
the company´s breeding station in Landskrona. Findus, in collaboration with 
Bjuv municipality will continue to run the breeding program of peas after its 
acquisition by the British Nomad Foods.  
Lantmännen and Scandinavian Seed are the main seed suppliers. 
Lantmännen was among the top twenty fodder producers in the EU with 
production that reached twelve million tonnes in 2013. Scandinavian Seed is 
an umbrella organization for Forsbecks AB, Skånefrö AB and Svenska Foder 
AB. Scandinavian Seed tests varieties developed in other EU countries and 
markets varieties that best  fit the climate conditions in Sweden. Table 2 
illustrates the volume of certified seed produced during 2015-2016 by 
respective seed company for selected crops. While Scandinavian Seed 
represents exclusively foreign varieties, Lantmännen markets varieties 
developed by SW Seed as well varieties licensed from other European 
breeders.  
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Table 2. Percentage of produced volume of certified cereal seed in Sweden for Autumn 
2015 – Spring 2016 by seed company.  
Organization  Seed  
class 
Barley Oats Durum 
wheat 
Triticale Wheat Rye 
Lantmännen Sum  69% 75% 100% 50% 62% 45% 
Lantmännen A 33% 56% 86% 65% 
Lantmännen B 33% 38% 53% 21% 
Lantmännen C 69% 45% 
Lantmännen C1 65% 74% 100% 64% 65% 
Lantmännen C2 69% 76% 100% 48% 62% 
Lantmännen F 40% 100% 68% 49% 
Scan. Seed Sum  31% 25% 50% 38% 56% 
Scan. Seed A 67% 44% 11% 35% 
Scan. Seed B 66% 62% 100% 
Scan. Seed C 47% 79% 55% 
Scan. Seed C1 28% 26% 36% 34% 
Scan. Seed C2 31% 24% 52% 38% 100% 
Scan. Seed F 52% 0% 1% 43% 96% 
Syngenta SE Sum 0% 
Syngenta SE A 0% 
Syngenta SE B 2% 
Syngenta SE C 31% 
Syngenta SE C1 7% 
Total vol (ton) Sum 49475 26759 335 4397 70914 1369 
Total vol (ton) A 63 20 73 56 
Total vol (ton) B 442 161 55 689 22 
Total vol (ton) C 35 1331 
Total vol (ton) C1 2738 1665 78 172 3381 
Total vol (ton) C2 46013 24841 257 4037 66640 10 
Total vol (ton) F 184 73 61 148 6 
Note: Classes F, A and B correspond to nucleus, pre-basic and foundation 
seed, and C, C1, C2 and C2 to certified seed. Source: own calculation based 
on publications from the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2016) and 
information received by SVUF 
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In addition to these major seed producers, there are a few small local 
suppliers spread across the country4. Furthermore, there are approximately 
thirty seed processing companies approved by SBA, which are registered 
seed units and about one hundred smaller unregistered facilities. Although 
these facilities vary in size and operation, their main operation is to process 
seed (clean and sort) for neighboring growers.  
1.3.4 Farm saved seed (FSS) channel 
An alternative to buying certified seed for the farmer is to save and replant 
seeds. This is a substantial channel considering that for cereal crops farm 
saved seed (FSS) historically accounts for approximately 20 to 25% of total 
seed. Figure 8 displays the origin of seed used in agricultural production for 
the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 as it has been estimated by SVUF in terms of 
seeded areas (hectares of land). In Sweden, it is legal for a farmer to use FSS 
of varieties protected by Plant Breeders Rights, provided that the farmer 
declares the use and pays the corresponding fee (remuneration). There exist 
several laws and statutes5 that regulate the collection of payments for the use 
of home-produced, non-certified seed of protected varieties. The Swedish 
Seed Trade Association (SVUF) is the responsible agency for the collection 
of the remunerations. 
4 The Dutch company Barenbrug and the Danish DLF represent in Sweden grass varieties. .Additionally Agrico 
Nordic AB, Bjälbo Trädgård AB, Munke & co, Stubbetorp potatis HB, are representatives of potato varieties. 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, 2100/94, Commission Regulations (EC) No,1768/95, 2605/98, 
795/2004 and 796/2004, The Swedish Plant Variety Rights Act (SFS 1997: 306). 
32 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 8. Share of seed used in agricultural production from different seed channels in 
Sweden for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018.  
Note: “other” refers to the estimated usage of illegal use of FSS or 
unprotected varieties. Source: SVUF  
During June 2015, SVUF and the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF) 
signed an agreement concerning the fees for the use of farm-produced non-
certified seed of protected varieties. This collaboration has contributed to a 
unique institutional environment: breeders are effectively protected from 
potential free riding behavior of farmers. The agreement was published in 
the official gazette of CPVO and specifies fees (remunerations) for each 
variety as a percentage of the current licensing fee for certified seed of class 
73% 74% 74%
22% 15% 14%
5% 11% 12%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018
spring wheat
Certified seed FSS Other
85%
89% 87%
13%
11%
11%
2% 0% 2%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
2016 2017 2018
spring barley
Certified seed FSS Other
72% 74% 77%
22% 20% 19%
6% 6% 4%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018
oats
Certified seed FSS Other
77% 77% 82%
18% 15% 12%
5% 8% 6%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018
Total cereals
Certified seed FSS Other
65%
87% 88%
16%
8% 8%19%
5% 4%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018
Peas
Certified seed FSS Other
74% 70% 77%
19%
13%
17%
7% 17% 6%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018
winter wheat
Certified seed FSS Other
33 
C2. The level of the fee is negotiated annually between SVUF, LRF, the 
Association of Swedish Cereal Growers (SpmO) and the Swedish Seed and 
Oil Plant Growers Association (SFO). Currently it is set to be 70% of the 
royalty level on certified seed. Additionally, farmers who fail to report their 
use of farm saved seed face a penalty fee based on their total farm acreage. 
According to the breakup analysis of seed price (Figure 9) provided by 
SVUF, a farmer that uses farm saved seed, can reduce the price of seed input 
at least by two thirds compared to the alternative of buying certified seed.  
Figure 9. Breakup analysis of the price of certified seed. Source: SVUF 
Small-scale farmers are exempted from paying remuneration fees6. These 
are farmers with capacity to produce at most 92 tons of cereals per year (and 
185 tons of potatoes per year). In the Swedish legislation this translates to 
farmers with 23.7 ha acreage of arable land for cereals on the holding; or 4,2 
ha for potatoes. Considering the farm structure in Sweden, approximately 
55% of the holdings are exempt from the regulations on FSS which amounts 
to 12% of total utilized agricultural area.  
To collect the fees, every year SVUF sends information and declaration 
forms to farmers. A small percentage of farmers typically ignores the 
reminders and thereby they may obtain a competitive advantage viz-á -viz 
6 European Commission Regulation EC 1768/95 
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those farmers who declare FSS and pay the fee. SVUF using information 
from the Single Farm Payment Register and in collaboration with processing 
facilities and seed producers is able to estimate the non-reported quantities 
of seed. Since the harvesting period of 2015, SVUF and LRF agreed to 
charge farmers that fail to report the use of FSS, with a fixed rate of 90 SEK 
per hectare. 
This resulted in the collection of an additional 2 million SEK for the year 
2015 with a total collection of 16.8 million SEK (declared use: 14.8 million 
SEK, undeclared use: 2 million SEK). The accounting of FSS royalties for 
the year 2016 shows a decrease in the total payments for the use of farm 
saved seed: 16.4 million SEK (declared use: 15 million SEK, undeclared use: 
1.4 million SEK). As it is evident, the compulsory acreage fee on the non-
declared use of farm saved seed has contributed significantly to breeders’ 
income. Additionally the decline in payments from undeclared use of seed 
shows a switch in farmers’ behavior; since the royalties from declared use of 
FSS increased only by 0.2 million SEK, it is rational to assume that some 
farmers switch to certified seed. 
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2.1 Intellectual Property Rights in plant biotechnology 
2.1.1  Patents and Plant Breeders Rights 
Institutional arrangements such as the establishment of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) have had, and continue to have, a strong impact on plant 
breeding. IPRs are defined as Rights granted by a state authority for certain 
products of intellectual effort and ingenuity (Prifti, 2015, p.31). Plant 
varieties, gene traits, and breeding technologies can be protected by IPRs. 
The most commonly used IPRs in plant biotechnology are patents and Plant 
Variety Rights, also known as Plant Breeders Rights (PBR). In Europe, new 
varieties are predominantly protected by PBRs.  
The United States was the first country to introduce patents on asexually 
produced plants (vegetative crop varieties) in 1930 through the Plant Patent 
Act as a means to bust the horticulture industry. The establishment of plant 
patents was the result of a long held view regarding utility patents and their 
statutory scope that believed to prohibit patenting on biological innovations. 
However, in 1980 in the famous Diamond v. Chakrabarty7 case the US court 
ruling paved the way for the patentability of virtually any biologically based 
invention that is obtained through human intervention. A second ruling in 
20118 confirmed the right to file utility patents for sexually and asexually 
reproducing plant seeds and plants traditionally bred or through genetic 
engineering (Clancy and Moschini, 2017).  
7  J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 
8  U.S. Supreme Court, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
2. Literature review
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Utility patents in USA are comparable to standard patents that are granted 
in Europe. The EU Biotechnology Directive9 opened the way for the 
patentability of plant-related innovations, despite criticism from the EU 
parliament. One essential difference between USA and EU patent laws is that 
the later do not allow the patenting of varieties. Native traits are not eligible 
for patenting either, although in the case of transgeneric traits patentability 
can be considered (Smith et al., 2016). 
Plant Breeders Rights is a sui generis form of intellectual property 
protection based on The International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention). The convention was initiated by 
European breeders and took place in Paris in 1957. This resulted in the 
establishment of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV) and the first Act of UPOV in 1961. The 1957 UPOV was 
later revised in 1972, and 1978 with the last adaptation taking place in 1991. 
The purpose of the 1991 Act was to protect new plant varieties by ensuring 
to the breeders’ property rights using a set of uniform and clearly defined 
principles. Currently, there are 120 member- countries of UPOV. Sweden 
became member of UPOV in December 1971 and became party to the 1991 
Act in 1998. 
There are several significant differences between PBRs and patents with 
respect to the subject of protection, the eligibility criteria, the scope and 
duration of protection. A major difference regards exceptions: utility patents 
in essence do not permit any exceptions, while PBRs allow for two 
exceptions: breeders exemption and farmers’ privilege.  
Breeders exemption. According to this exception, a breeder that has been 
granted PBRs cannot act against another party that uses the protected variety 
for further research and development of a new variety. In the case of 
coexistence of two IPRs schemes, the EU Biotechnology Directive stipulates 
that when a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right without 
infringing a prior patent, he may apply for a compulsory licence for non-
exclusive use of the invention protected by the patent (Chapter 3, Article 12, 
Paragraph 1). This compulsory licensing is not included under current US 
patent laws.  
Farmers privilege. The second optional provision, enables each member 
state to recognize a common practice of farmers saving own seed for the 
9  Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions   
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purpose of re-sowing, and decide whether farmers should be allowed to use 
farm saved seed of protected varieties exclusively on their own holdings.  
Due to the inclusion of these two exemptions, PBRs offer weaker protection 
compared to patent rights.  
2.1.2 Impact of Intellectual property rights on social welfare, growth 
and innovation 
The optimal level of intellectual protection for plant varieties has been a 
prominent issue in international debate. Weaker IPRs might diminish the 
economic incentive to invest in new technologies, however stronger IPRs 
restrain access to germplasm, slow down innovation pace and decrease 
spillovers in research and development (S. H. Lence et al., 2016). The form 
and the extent of the optimal IPRs is still an open question as there are no 
clear patterns predicting the relationship between IRPs and innovation and 
growth in the context of plant biotechnology (Alston and Venner, 2002; 
Lence et al., 2005; Moschini and Yerokhin, 2007a; Ambec et al., 2008; 
Perrin and Fulginiti, 2009; Clancy and Moschini, 2013; S. H. Lence et al., 
2016; Baudry and Hervouet, 2017; Gray et al., 2017). 
Several empirical studies suggest that the relationship between IPRs and 
growth depends on the stage of the economic development of a country 
(Galushko, 2012; Campi and Nuvolari, 2015; Campi, 2016). A study on the 
impact of the strength of IPRs for plant varieties on GDP per capita shows a 
strong positive effect only for developed countries and a significant 
correlation between strengthening of IPPs and agricultural added value 
(Campi and Nuvolari, 2015). The UPOV had a significant effect on USA 
seed trade for developed countries (Galushko, 2012). The impact of IPRs on 
yield varies by a country’s GDP: there is positive link between strengthening 
IPRs and yield productivity for low and high-income countries, but no 
significant effect is found for middle-income countries.  
Most of the theoretical studies on the impact of IPRs schemes on welfare 
and the optimal level of adoption focus on the ability of other breeders to use 
protected material (ex. research and breeders exemptions). However, the 
results are highly heterogeneous and sensitive to model assumptions. Alston 
and Venner (2002) develop a Stackelberg competition model to examine the 
impact of PBRs on breeders’ incentives to innovate. The authors argue that 
the research effort and the quality of the new variety increases along with the 
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ability of the innovator to detect and collect royalties of the seed companies 
producing and selling the developed variety (appropriability).  
Lence et al. (2005) develop a single country vertical market equilibrium 
model where the strength of intellectual property protection is measured by 
the degree of appropriability extracted by the innovator. The authors argue 
that there is a tradeoff between breeders and farmers surplus, however below 
a certain threshold of intellectual property protection both groups can benefit 
from increasing the level of appropriability. A policy maker can only justify 
high levels of appropriability only by attaching greater weight for the welfare 
of research and development firms as opposed to consumers and farmers.  
Moschini and Yerokhin (2007) develop a game theoretic model to study 
the effect of research exemption on breeders’ economic incentive to innovate 
which captures the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency existing 
in different IPR regimes. Stronger IPRs provide stronger ex ante incentives 
for firms to invest in R&D however weaker IPRs “ensure a larger pool of 
innovators for follow up inventions”(pg.16). The authors argue that breeders 
will always prefer stronger IPRs protection such as patents as they suffice 
that in any given level of cost in R&D there is a range of the returns which 
ensure the viability of firms in order to participate in the first period of R&D 
contest. In addition, the rate of return under patents is higher compared to the 
rate of return under PBRs.  
Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) further their analysis in order to examine 
not only breeder incentives but also societal welfare. The model illustrates 
two competitive firms, a leader and a follower who compete in a dynamic 
context aiming to develop the next dominant product. The authors showcase 
again that the two competitive firms will always prefer full patent protection 
ex ante. From a social welfare perspective, either regime (PBRs vs patents) 
can be optimal given that the outcome depends on relative magnitudes of the 
costs of initial innovation and improvement. The authors argue that full 
patent regime is most likely to dominate when research costs are relatively 
high since research exemption often fails to provide adequate incentives for 
the firms to invest.  
Lence et al. (2016) develop a non-stochastic infinite horizon dynamic 
model where each firm decides the optimal level of investment in order to 
compare societal welfare under PBRs and patents. The results depend on two 
key parameters: research complexity and the rate at which genetic 
improvement deprecates. When the depreciation rate is 100% (example short 
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lived commercial varieties) PBRs is preferred to patents for all levels of 
research complexity. Both systems generate the same genetic improvement 
and amount of social welfare. They authors argue that there is a tradeoff 
between incentives to innovate and technological diffusion. While PBRs 
leads to faster diffusion, patents incentivize breeders to invest in complex 
long lasting research programs. 
Some research attempts have been made to capture the impact of farmers´ 
privilege. Galushko (2008) argues that a breeder who selects a durable good 
strategy and charges a higher price, prefers the protection offered by PBRs 
compared to patents. Ambec et al. (2008) partially share Galushko’s view. 
In their analysis, they incorporate the level of fee for the use of farm saved 
seed and argue that when the fee is low, the durable good payoff dominates 
the non-durable good. However as the fee increases the monopoly payoff 
from nondurable good strategy exceeds the durable good payoff.  
Hervouet and Langinier (2018) build on Galushko’s (2008) and include 
in their model taxes collected from farm saved seed. They argue that when 
replanting is highly efficient and the level of taxation relatively low, the 
breeder will opt for a durable good strategy. The level of investment that 
maximizes society’s welfare can be achieved under PBRs when both regimes 
coexist.  Specifically, breeders may prefer to allow farmers replanting their 
varieties if they have the ability to charge a higher price in the first period; a 
common strategy for durable goods. Ultimately, a patent system helps to 
prevent under investment even though it does not rule out replanting all 
together; when only PBRs are available the optimal investment levels are 
lower than if both patent and PBR regimes are available, therefore PBRs 
and patents regime intensify research investment (Hervouet and Langinier, 
2018, p.23). However, the authors exclude from their analysis “breeders’ 
exception” which allows other breeders to reproduce a fairly similar variety. 
Arzandeh(2017) examine three distinct cases of IPRs settings, allowing 
for farmers’ exception, breeders’ exemption and full IPRs protections with 
both exemptions. In a Cournot duopoly they develop scenarios where 
breeders are equally efficient in conducting R&D or asymmetric. They argue 
that in case of symmetry, research exemption generates the highest surplus 
for the breeder while farmer’s exemption is the least favorable.  
In conclusion, there is a diverse set of intellectual protection schemes in 
plant biotechnology with the major ones being utility patents and PBRs. 
Internationally, the scope and the strength of both regimes has been 
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increasing while research shows a heterogeneous impact of strong IPRs on 
social welfare and innovation.  
2.2 Farmers´ seed choices 
As illustrated in the previous section, there are numerous studies on the 
impact of intellectual property protection regimes on measures of social 
welfare such as farmers and breeders surplus, growth and innovation. IPRs 
are often identified as one of the major drivers behind consolidation in the 
plant breeding industry. The establishment of IPR schemes is the starting 
point and central to Paper I where it is argued that IPRs create power 
asymmetry in the seed value chain and have therefore been a driver of 
consolidation in plant breeding industry in Sweden.  
Papers II and III examine the impact of IPRs on the lower part of the seed 
supply chain; specifically on farmers´ choice of seed. There is a vast 
literature focusing on seed choices typically in the context of technology 
adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Conley and Udry, 
2010; Maertens and Barrett, 2013; Maertens, 2017; Beaman et al., 2018).  
Farmers need to decide between opting for high yielding varieties, often 
genetically modified, and traditional varieties. In developing countries, the 
widespread adoption of seeds with significant varietal improvements is not 
always accomplished (Almekinders et al., 2019; Eriksson et al., 2018; 
Hoogendoorn et al., 2018). Issues related to the institutional, socio-
economical environment as well as to local agronomic and climate 
conditions, have been identified as major factors driving the prevalence of 
certain seed types (Singh and Agrawal, 2019). Additionally, the literature on 
attitudes of farmers living in developed (Furtas, 2016) as well as developing 
economics (Maredia et al., 2019) towards the quality of certified and FSS is 
sparse.  
Both papers II and III examine seed choice not in the context of the 
embedded technology of the varieties, but by focusing on the farmers’ 
preferences of seed channel. To the best of my knowledge, no prior study has 
investigated empirically the impact of farmers’ perceptions on the usefulness 
and fairness of the PBRs fees, on their seed choices and specifically with a 
focus on developed economies. A reason for this can be the widespread 
adoption of genetically modified and biotech crops cultivated in non EU 
developed countries. For instance, the United States is not only a top global 
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producer of transgenic crops but also a top adopter of GM plant 
biotechnology (Pechlaner and Otero, 2008). This in practice means that the 
adoption of agricultural technologies protected by patents, combined with 
the strong IPRs enforcement mechanisms do not allow farmers to save and 
reuse their seed. However, as more and more patents on varieties that are still 
widely used expire, a better understanding of farmers’ preferences regarding 
their choice of seed channel becomes of increasing relevance.  
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In his classic work Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Williamson (2000) 
highlights the importance of institutions in the function of the markets. 
Williamsons develops a four-level social analysis of the economics of the 
institutions where both formal and informal institutions are taken into 
account (see Figure 10). The first level of analysis refers to unofficial, 
unwritten institutions such as social norms, customs and traditions. The 
second level focuses on the rules of the game which are formal institutions 
such as laws and formally written rules. The third level refers to the play of 
the game and how actors given the existing laws and contracts align 
governance structures with transactions. The last level is associated with the 
neoclassical paradigm as it deals with resource allocation. Each of the levels 
is not independent but rather constrained by the levels above it; resource 
allocation is constrained by laws and regulations, which have been shaped 
by the culture and norms. Additionally, each lower level can provide 
feedback to the level above and therefore affect it.  The rests of the section 
provides a more detailed view of each level and positions the articles in this 
thesis in relation to them.  
The first level of the analysis, embeddedness, contains informal 
constraints such as norms, customs and traditions that hold a strong impact 
over the long-term character of economies (North, 1990). The concept of 
embeddedness relates to the ongoing network relations that ultimately 
constrain behavior and institutions (Granovetter, 1985). Papers III and IV 
examine farmers´ decisions in relation to their respective social networks. 
For instance paper III attempts to untangle farmers’ seed network relations 
and its underline assumption is that seed savings is a practice narrowly 
connected to community knowledge (Breen, 2015). The seeds being sowed, 
the knowledge of how to grow and save them, the methods and tools used, 
3. Conceptual framework  
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and uses of seeds … are always changing and exist always in relation with 
others (Phillips, 2016, p.3). Stated otherwise, considering that economic 
action is embedded in ongoing social ties, social networks should also be 
present in farmer´s seed choices. In fact, farmers networks have historically 
been an important channel for the transmission of information related to crop 
varieties, their agronomic requirements, yields etc. (Coomes et al., 2015).  
The second level of analysis, the institutional environment, refers to 
formal rules such as constitutions, laws and property rights. According to 
Williamson, designing the instruments of the level (executive, legislative, 
judicial functions) although crucial it is hardly possible to be achieved 
without major irruptions, as it is an ongoing process. This level of analysis 
highlights the importance of property rights; once they have been defined 
with enforcement mechanisms in place, the government may step aside as 
markets take over. This is the focus of paper I, which examines the evolution 
of plant breeding in Sweden. This paper acts as a prequel to papers II and III 
as it acknowledges that that former decisions have an impact upon current 
settings (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011). Paper I focuses on the changes in the 
domestic and global organizational, political and regularity environment, 
such as the establishment of IPRs, and their impact on Swedish breeding 
programs and organizations. Whether farmers opt for certified or farm saved 
seed and to what extent is not a decision that happens in a vacuum; contrary, 
it relates to stipulations of IPRs regimes in place and their ongoing revisions. 
In the latest revision of UPOV (Act of 1991), farmers’ privilege became an 
optional provision for each country member to decide upon. Countries may 
opt to allow replanting as long as the farmers pay royalty fees to the breeders. 
Internationally, various stakeholders argue that this provision neglects the 
historical contribution of farmers in plant breeding and limits their rights. 
Examining the interplay between seed choices (certified vs fss) and IPRs in 
Sweden (Papers II and III) becomes an necessary case study, as the major 
commercial plant breeder is an agricultural cooperative with a vast 
membership; in a country with less than 21.000 full time farmers, 
Lantmännen is owned by 20.000 Swedish farmers.  
The third level of social analysis, governance, goes beyond property 
rights and focusses on the governance of contractual relations. The unit of 
analysis is the transaction and the objective is to conduct a comparative 
examination of the relative transactions costs entailed in different 
governance structures and opt for the structure that minimizes the sum of 
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production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Until today four 
scholars have been awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences, for their contributions in institutional economics and its most 
prominent branch transaction cost economics: Ron Coase (1991), Douglas 
North (1993), Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom (both in 2009). As the 
theory and applications to the theory of transaction costs count for more than 
eight decades (since Coase’s seminal paper in 1937) of ongoing research, it 
seems improbable the idea of a novel contribution to the literature. To the 
best of my knowledge, the choice of seed framed as make or buy decision 
(paper III) has never been investigated before.   
Figure 10: Economics of institutions. Adopted from Williamson (2000)  
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traditions, norms
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4.1 Paper I 
Both primary and secondary sources of data were used for the analysis 
presented in paper I. First, I constructed a dataset using data available from 
the Plant Variety Database of UPOV (Pluto) and the National Listings Data 
and Common Catalogue Data (NLI) combined them with statistics regarding 
the production of certified seed published by the SBA. In cases of 
inconclusive information from the above databases, I consulted with SVUF.  
To perform content analysis, I used both primary sources: interviews with 
stakeholders; as well as secondary material such as annual reports, 
presentations for shareholders, conferences presentations, seminars, public 
debates, newspaper articles. The interviews were conducted in several 
locations across Sweden; SLU campus Ultuna, SLU camplus Alnarp, 
Lantmännen and SVUF facilities in region Skåne. Most of the interviews 
were conducted in the autumn of 2016. The interviews started with 
professors in plant breeding within SLU who later introduced me to industry 
stakeholders.  
4.2 Papers II and III 
Papers II and III are based on primary data obtained through a 
questionnaire. The collection of primary data is a time consuming method 
with inherent risks; there is a long preparation stage before the actual data 
collection with no guarantee for the outcome. The design of the questionnaire 
started during December 2018 and the survey was finally distributed during 
4. Data  
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June - July 2019 to all farmers´ in Sweden that have registered an email 
address to the Swedish national database of owners of agricultural land. Prior 
to the data collection, in depth interviews with farmers were conducted and 
thereafter the survey was reviewed by representatives of LRF, SVUF and 
SpmO. The survey was also tested on students of the agronomy program at 
SLU in two face-to-face sessions. Lastly, the final online version was tested 
by a selected group of farmers. The latter group was not randomly selected, 
but rather based on their availability to provide feedback during a specific 
period.  
One of the most unforeseeable troubles with the data collection regarded 
a very technical aspect of the distribution; how to send out 35.000 emails 
without compromising network security. To achieve this and in close 
collaboration with the IT department of SLU, a webpage nested at the official 
departmental webpage was developed. Farmers could find the link to the 
online survey as well as information about the research project and the group 
of researchers responsible for it. The distribution of the first email invitations 
to participate in the survey took place from 24th to 28th of June and reminders 
were send three weeks afterwards. This process lasted for approximately two 
months and it was the first time that SLU attempted to contact via email 
35.0000 individuals external to the institution. 
An alternative to this approach, was to outsource the data collection to the 
Swedish Board of Agriculture. However, a direct implication of this would 
had been a massive reduction of the sample size. After consultation with the 
SBA, we decided to proceed without the SBA´s involvement. It is broadly 
accepted that SLU has built a strong network and good reputation among 
Swedish farmers as many have studied themselves or their children at SLU. 
Additionally, there are no –at least perceived- misaligned incentives or 
conflicts between Swedish farmers and SLU, which is a situation that may 
occur between the farmers and SBA 
In total, 2508 completed and 992 uncompleted participations were 
recorded, including missing values. This corresponds to at least 10% 
response rate. The exact response rate has not been possible to calculate due 
to the presence of incorrect email addresses in the registry. The average age 
of farmer in the sample is 55 years and 83% of the participants are male. 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the farms in the sample based on their 
location (n=3002).  
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Figure 11. Farmers’ participation in the survey by area division followed by 
national agricultural statistics (complementary map with explanations of the 
abbreviations exists on the Appendix).  
The majority of the farmers (19%)  are located in Götalands mellanbygder 
(Gmb). More than half of the sample size observations (63%) are located in 
the wider region of southern and central Sweden´s plains (Södra och 
mellersta Sveriges slättbygder). Figure 12 displays the number of holding in 
the sample by size of agricultural area. Comparing it with the national level 
information (Figure 2), it appears that there is an over representation of large-
scale farmers in the sample. However, the national catalogue of agricultural 
holdings includes also owners of agricultural land that are not involved in 
agricultural production (non-farmers), while the survey was answered 
exclusively by farmers.  
Figure 12. Number of holdings by farm size 
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Figure 13 displays the number of farmers using exclusively certified seed 
or certified seed together with farm saved seed. This figure has similarities 
to Figure 8, which is based on nationwide data, however there are three major 
differences. First, the percentage shares provided by SVUF are based on 
seeded areas (hectares of land seeded by certified or FSS) while figure 13 
displays share of farmers using the alternative seed channels. Second, we 
distinguish between farmers using exclusively certified seed and farmers 
using both certified and farm saved seed. Third, SVUF distinguishes between 
legal and illegal use of FSS. Therefore, a direct comparison of the two figures 
is misleading.  
Figure 13.  Number of farmers using certified or FSS by crop 
4.3 Paper IV 
The data required for the analysis of the last paper are also based on primary 
data collection and specifically based on repeated cross sectional survey. The 
first round took place during 1993 with two subsequent rounds with 10 year 
intervals. Unlike the rest of the papers, I was not involved in the data 
collection process.   
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5.1 Paper I. The wizards of Svalöf 
The aim of this study is a twofold; first to map the evolution of plant breeding 
in Sweden and explore changes in the domestic and global organizational, 
political and regulatory environment and second to calculate the ratio of 
domestically vs foreign bred varieties in Sweden. Overall, the main argument 
of the article is that IPRs are a major force that lead Sweden to lose its 
position in the global arena.  
There are two points to further deliberate upon, which are not currently 
included in the discussion of the published article. First, an objection to the 
main argument that could be made is that with weaker IPRs schemes 
disincentivise licensing agreements, as firms might be reluctant to license 
and opt for M&A in the fear of IP theft. This would imply that stronger IPRs 
reduce the need for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and therefore act 
against consolidation. While this is a hard to dispute claim generally, when 
examining plant breeding in Sweden as a case study, I did not find evidence 
supporting it. Contrary, in one of the interviews with a former director of SW 
seed, it was explicitly stated that it was the dependence on licensing 
agreements that drove SW to search for collaborations with the “big” seed 
multinational corporations. The partnership with BASF and the formation of 
BASF Plant Science was a response from the SW Seed management to the 
increased dependencies on licensing agreements. Even though theoretically, 
licensing could help a firm maintain its independence while still enables the 
firm to gain access over protected materials, in reality transaction costs such 
as legal uncertainties, limited patent experience and costs related to contracts 
and negotiation of license fees, could lead a firm to opt against licensing. 
5. Results and discussion
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Whether the absence of strong IPRs, would generate greater waves of M&A 
is a hypothetical question, beyond the scope of this article.  
A second issue to be discussed is the relevance of patent protection in the 
Swedish context. PBRs are mostly used to protect varieties bred with 
traditionally breeding techniques while patents are associated with GM 
technology and traditionally bred hybrid varieties. It is also true that in 
Sweden, GM crops are cultivated only for research purposes. Since in PBRs 
regime, the ‘breeders’ exemption’ ensures that protected varieties can be 
used to breed new varieties, it would be rational to argue that IP protection 
does not restrict the use of protected genetic material. However, SW Seeds 
was active in GM breeding with varieties that were bred in Sweden and 
produced and marketed in Canada. Additionally, it is not uncommon for a 
variety protected with PBRs to contain DNA-constructs protected by utility 
patents. This double protection of plant varieties creates an interface issue, 
as the exemptions provided by one regime do not limit the rights of the other. 
In other words, a breeder cannot exercise breeders´ exemption without the 
risk of a patent infringement.  
5.2 Papers II and III. Certified versus farm saved seed 
Papers II and III examine the factors that influence Swedish farmers´ choice 
of seed and any potential relation between royalty fees related to PBRs and 
farmers’ choices. Both articles are based on the same survey data but differ 
in terms of the econometric approach taken, the theoretical framework as 
well as variables included in the respective models.  
The title of paper II “Save or Buy” is a wordplay on make-or-buy 
decisions. The later refers to a strand of literature in organizational studies 
the beginning of which can be traced to the classic paper by Coase (1937). 
The transaction cost approach was selected for the empirical investigation of 
the research question (certified vs FSS). An alternative approach could had 
been the resource based view (Barney, 1991). According to this theory, a 
firm would prefer to outsource the production of inputs non-critical to the 
firm’s competitive advantage. However, the resource-based view is less 
relevant in this specific context, considering that the majority of farmers in 
Sweden use certified seed and that that seed is a crucial factor for the success 
of farmers’ agricultural operations.  
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The theoretical framework of the papers was partially developed while 
building up the survey. The interviews with farmers during the preparation 
stage, revealed a tradeoff in farmers’ choice of seed channel; they would 
either have to invest in their own facilities and skills (and therefore avoid 
dependence on upstream partners) or be confident in their personal 
relationship with their seed suppliers or processors. The farmers were in 
essence describing Williamson´s argument (Williamson, 1985); transaction 
characteristics such as asset specificity and uncertainty combined with actors 
own limitations (meaning bounded rational individuals subject to/with 
propensity to opportunism) determine which transactions will be executed 
internally and which will be procured in the market. Paper II attempts to 
disentangle the impact of these transaction specific characteristics while 
Paper III examines the impact of spatial relations with other farmers on their 
seed choices. 
A major distinction between the two papers regards the construction of 
the dependent variable. In paper II three governance structures are examined 
based on transaction costs economics typology in the context of farmers´ 
selection of seed procurement strategies; vertical integration (self-clean 
FSS), market transaction (certified seed) and a hybrid form (custom clean 
FSS). Additionally, in order to control for the impact of different crops on 
the selection of different seed strategies farmers are repeatedly sampled for 
each level of the various crop varieties (panel structure). Paper III goes 
beyond transaction characteristics, and examines seed choices in the context 
of social learning and networks. We distinguish only between farmers that 
use exclusively certified seed for the total acreage and farmers who mix 
certified with FSS. In this paper, the impact of different choice of seed across 
crops is not examined. The underlying assumption here is that the knowledge 
related to seed savings is not dependent on the crop characteristics. That is 
to say if a farmers is knowledgeable in seed saving practices for wheat, it is 
assumed that this farmer will also be knowledgeable is seed saving practices 
for barley.  
In paper II we find that farmers´ assessment of the quality seed in terms 
of genetic purity of each channel has no impact on their choice of seed while 
personal relations with their upstream partners, investments in the farm as 
well as delivery contracts affect farmers´ procurement strategy. Paper III 
further investigates the impact of personal relations on farmers’ choices and 
finds evidence of neighbor effects. The findings of the two papers are 
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complementary; the choice of governance depends on the costs of transaction 
and the choice is also embedded in structures of social relations (Granovetter, 
1985).  
Lastly, with respect to royalty fees for the protected varieties, we find the 
following. First, farmers who are subject to the property rights fee are less 
likely to outsource the processing of FSS. This is not surprising, assuming 
that there is a small minority of farmers who seeks to “free ride” and avoid 
the payment of the fee. The agency responsible for the collection of royalty 
fees in Sweden (SVUF), acquires information from seed processing facilities 
across country and controls the information provided by farmers. In this way, 
farmers who do not report their use of FSS (or report zero use), yet process 
seed are identified and charged. Second, we find that farmers´ perception 
regarding the fairness of the fees doesn´t affect their choice of seed channel. 
5.3 Papers III and IV. Social networks and agricultural 
cooperatives 
Papers III and IV examine the impact of social relationships in two 
distinctive areas; the choice of seed channel and farmers involvement in the 
governance of their agricultural cooperatives. In paper III, social 
relationships are disentangled using a combination of farmers´ spatial 
proximity with belongingness to the same cooperative organizations. Paper 
III provides evidence on non-spatial randomness on farmers´ procurement 
decisions and the results of article IV indicate strong relationship between 
social networks and farmers’ propensity to participate in cooperative 
governance. 
Both papers III and IV  are based on primary data collected via surveys. 
In paper III, every farmer with a registered email address in the national 
registry had the opportunity to respond to the survey (as explained in Section 
3.2.2) while a representative sample of farmers was selected for paper IV. 
Another approach commonly used in social network analysis is the 
“Snowball Method”. To collect data, the researcher starts with a core group 
of individuals and their connections and later reach out to these new 
connections and collect information on their connections and so on. This 
method has the benefit of high degree of control over the collected data 
however is requires abundance of resources and it leads to biased results and 
therefore has not been selected. 
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The focus on research related to cooperative membership is motivated by 
the structure of the domestic agricultural sector. Historically, the contribution 
of agricultural cooperatives in Sweden’s industrialization processes has been 
significant (Nilsson et al., 2012). Today, the country’s biggest agricultural 
organization is cooperative (Lantmannen) with more than 20.000 farmers-
members. This is a vast membership base considering that there are 21.000 
full time farmers nationwide. Several studies suggest that social relationships 
are important in cooperative membership (Mensah et al., 2012; Feng et al., 
2015) and cooperative membership is highly related to farmers’ procurement 
decisions (Bernard et al., 2010; Abebaw and Haile, 2013).  
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6.1 The Wizards of Svalöf; Intellectual property rights and 
consolidation in the plant breeding industry 
This paper focuses on the evolution of plant breeding in Sweden. We identify 
the establishment and enforcement of IPRs along with changes in domestic 
agriculture and Sweden´s entrance in EU as major factors of the structural 
changes the industry has undergone during a period of 130 years. This study 
contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the impact of IRPs on 
consolidation by analyzing the Swedish plant breeding industry as a case 
study. Additionally we extend the work of Solberg and Breian (2015) by 
providing an index of foreign versus domestically bred varieties. To the best 
of our knowledge this study is the first to explore changes in global and 
domestic organizational, political and regulatory environments and their 
impact on the evolution of the Swedish plant breeding industry through the 
lens of the global value chains.  
The global value chain typology (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi and Lee, 
2012) is used to illustrate the seed value chain in Sweden. In the upper 
segment of the chain, which is the focus of the paper, a few Swedish plant 
breeders are dependent on Life Science Multinational Corporations that 
determine the distribution of profits along the chain ( Lee and Gereffi, 2015; 
Hendrickson et al., 2019). IPRs are a major source of the above power 
asymmetry and can increase consolidation in the industry in the two 
following ways; first by prohibiting new firms to enter the market 
(Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson, 1997; Louwaars et al., 2009) and second 
by providing incentives for vertical integration, strategic alliances, 
6. Summary of appended papers
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contracting and various types of licensing agreements among existing firms 
(Lesser, 1999; Shi, 2009; Maisashvili et al., 2016).  
In order to untangle the evolution of plant breeding in Sweden and 
identify the factors that contributed to a series M&A of Swedish 
organizations, content analysis has been performed (Cho and Lee, 2014). 
Interviews with stakeholders, scientific literature on the subject as well as 
material from annual reports, presentations for shareholders, conference 
presentations, seminars, public speeches and newspapers have been 
reviewed. This analysis resulted in a formation of a map that illustrates the 
establishment of early plant breeders in 1880s and the subsequent major 
M&A that took place in the Swedish seed industry.  
We find that a major part the country´s history on plant breeding can be 
traced to the origins of the formerly known breeding organization SW Seed 
(now integrated into Lantmännen´s operations). The organization was the 
outcome of a merger between Svalöf AB; a 50% state supported cooperative 
and W.Weibul; a family owned company. At the time of the merger, the two 
former companies jointly owned 17 subsidiary companies 14 of which were 
located in Europe and North America. The international presence of Swedish 
plant breeders and their path breaking research earned them the title of 
“Wizards of Svalöf”. During 1990s, increased dependencies on license 
agreements led the management of the organization to seek partnership with 
a major multinational corporation. The consequent formation of BASF plant 
science did not generate the anticipated results and combined with a switch 
in the attitudes relating to international ambitions in plant breeding in the 
management of cooperative, led to gradual disinvestments; today there are 
only three breeding stations owned by the cooperative. In recent years, 
acquisition of the breeding station in Germany by Syngenta and the 
collaboration with Secobra in 2014 were enacted as a means of enabling 
Lantmännen to access material and technologies protected by IPRs and 
owned by Syngenta and Secobra (Gertsson et al., 2014).  
Changes in the domestic agricultural policy and Sweden’s entrance into 
the EU have also shaped the evolution of the industry. At the beginning of 
the 1990s the stated reduced the land allocated for agricultural production 
and withdrew the financing from Svalöf AB (Kuylenstjerna 1997).  
Lastly, we provide a proxy for the level of dependence on foreign-bred 
varieties by calculating the percentage of production of certified seed 
originating from Swedish bred varieties. To do this, we combined data on 
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production of certified seed for the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 with data from 
the Community Plant Variety Office and PLUTO database regarding 
information on the origin of the breeding station of each cultivar. We find 
that wheat and oats are the two crops with a relatively high presence of 
Swedish-bred cultivars. There is still a limited amount of Swedish bred-
varieties on the market for winter rye. For the remaining cereal crops, almost 
all winter barley, spelt, spring durum wheat, spring triticale and maze 
cultivars were not bred in Sweden. 
6.2 Save or buy 
The choice of seed is an essential decision for agricultural production. A 
farmer has to decide upon the varieties to sow and whether to buy certified 
varieties every year or use his own farm saved seed (FSS) in subsequent 
periods. If the farmers opts for the later, he also has to decide whether to 
process the seed in the farm, or outsource the processing to a third party. 
Thus, there are three alternative options; buy certified seed, outsource the 
processing of FSS  (pseudo make) or process in own facilities (make).  
In Sweden, FSS accounts for typically around 20% of the seed used in the 
production of grains. The implementation of PBRs regime in country allows 
farmers to use protected varieties as long as they report their use and pay 
royalty fees. The amount of the fee is negotiated annually among the Swedish 
Seed Trade Association (SVUF), the Swedish Board of Agriculture (SBA) 
and two farmers’ interest organizations (LRF & SPMO). Farmers with 
operations less than 23.7 hectares are exempt from the fee. Additionally, 
farmers who misreport or fail to report the use of farm saved are subject to a 
penalty fee based on their total farm acreage. This is a unique arrangement 
that has mostly eliminated free riding among farmers who costume clean 
their FSS.  
This paper aims to examine the factors that influence farmers’ choice of 
seed, and specifically why some farmers buy exclusively certified seed while 
others use both certified and FSS. A special aim of the paper is to explore 
whether the enforcement of the of royalty fee affects farmers ‘choices. The 
literature on farmers choice of seed, with respect to the embedded technology 
(advanced vs traditional varieties) is extensive however to the best of our 
knowledge no prior study examines farmers choice of seed channel.   
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We use of one of the most prominent theories examining make or buy 
decisions which was originally developed by Nobel Prize laureates Ronald 
Coase (1937) and  Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985). The choice between 
buying certified seed (buy), produce and process in-house FSS (make) or 
produce and contract an external processor of FSS (pseudo-make) has been 
framed as a save or buy choice following transaction cost theory (TCT) logic 
Farmers are assumed to make –bounded- rational choices that economize the 
sum of transaction and production costs. According to TCT, transactions 
differ according to their attributes, namely asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency. We distinguish between physical asset specific and relational 
asset specific and identify sources of uncertainty (input and output 
uncertainty) in order to develop hypotheses that link transaction attributes to 
governance structures.  
We test the hypotheses using data obtained from a nationwide survey 
conducted during summer 2019. We focus on six crops and with the use of 
random effects models we identify the factors that drive farmers seed 
strategies. Factors associated both with asset specificity and uncertainty were 
found significant. Access to farm equipment with lower level of asset 
specificity (dryers) increases the probability of using farm saved seed almost 
three time as much compared to assets with higher level of asset specificity 
(cleaner and treatment equipment). Additionally relational capital (trust) 
with the processors and seed suppliers was found to have a significant 
impact. Delivery contracts are often used between farmers and their buyers 
and it is a common way for farmers to tackle price and output uncertainty. 
As our theoretical framework predicts, delivery contracts increase the 
likelihood of a farmer to use certified seed, which is a common stipulation in 
such contracts. Contrary, we find that farmers’ assessments regarding the 
varietal purity of seed, had no impact in their choices.  
6.3 Spatial seeds 
Swedish farmers can use farm saved seed as long as they report its use and 
pay the corresponding royalty fee in accordance with PBRs stipulations. 
Previous research has shown that trust developed between farmers and their 
upstream partners is a important factor for their choice of seed channel 
(Morfi et al., 2020). In this paper, we relax the conventional assumption of 
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independent observations in order to investigate the presence of neighbor and 
peer effects in farmer´s choice of seed channel.  
Seed savings is a practice as old as agriculture. It enables farmers to retain 
independency from seed suppliers and reduce the cost of agricultural inputs 
(Furtas, 2016; Mascarenhas and Busch, 2006). However malpractices in 
proper seed savings processes can result in seed with lower viability and 
varietal purity compared to certified seed and thus lead to a significant yield 
reduction (Khazaei et al., 2016; Peltonen-Sainio et al., 2011; Reddy et al., 
2000). This is because the use of FSS requires both capital investments and 
knowledge. The farmer must be able to select seed based on the performance 
of parental lines and in conjunction with the local agronomic and climatic 
conditions. The farmer must also be knowledgeable regarding the proper 
storage conditions (Khazaei et al., 2016). This knowledge not only enables 
farmer to retain independence and a potential to reduce their costs, but can 
also act as parallel to the formal seed channel safeguarding access to seed in 
cases of unpredictable disruptions in the formal value chains.  
There is a plethora of research examining farmers´ choice of seed, 
examined commonly as a choice between different agricultural technologies 
(ex. genetically modifies vs traditional varieties) (Asfaw et al., 2011; Asrat 
et al., 2010; Shiferaw et al., 2008). Several studies focus on network effects 
on farmers´ uptake of agricultural technology (Conley and Christopher, 
2001; Conley and Udry, 2010; Maertens and Barrett, 2013) while some 
studies examine specifically the role of social learning (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Maertens, 2017; Beaman et al., 2018). 
This article examines the impact of social learning in farmers’ choice of seed 
channel. In this way, the notion of knowledge in embedded in the practice of 
seed savings. In addition, the choice of seed channel is not subject to 
correlation effects arising from similarities in agronomics-climate conditions 
among neighboring farmers.  
The second objective of the paper is to examine the impact of farmers’ 
opinions regarding royalty fees on their choice of seed channel. To the best 
of our knowledge, no prior research exists on the topic. This is a significant 
aspect of the paper as it is often assumed that farmers are inherently against 
the collection of fees for the use of second generation seed. Lastly, we 
distinguish between neighbor and peer effects by constructing weight 
matrices not only based on location but with additional control of cooperative 
membership. We define peers as farmers who belong to the same 
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municipality and are members of at least one of the same cooperative 
organizations. 
The data used for the analysis are based on an online survey that was 
conducted during summer 2019 and was addressed to 34.000 farmers in 
Sweden. These are farmers with a registered postal and email address and 
the national catalogues of agricultural firms. We received at least 10% 
response rate included surveys with incomplete responses and missing 
values.  To test for spatial randomness, as a first step, we employ Moran´s I 
statistics and Geary’s C statistics based on both join count statistics as well 
as Monte Carlo simulations of join count statistics (Moran, 1948; Geary, 
1954).  To do this, we construct weight matrices based on nearest neighbors 
within a fixed radius of 1, 5 and 10 km as well as based on farmers 3, 5 and 
10 nearest neighbors.   
As a next step, we analyze the choice of seed channel using spatial 
autoregressive (SAR) probit models and with the use of Bayesian Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo estimators (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Bayesian inference 
implies that by a sufficiently large sample from any distribution we can in 
essence calculate the whole distribution without having to rely on asymptotic 
approximations (Gilks et al., 1995). Additionally, SAR models allow us to 
capture direct and indirect effects  with the latter being the effect of a change 
on farmer´s i explanatory variable on farmers j´s decision to opt for a certain 
type of seed channel (Behrens and Thisse, 2007).  
Based on the statistics tests we fail to reject the null hypothesis of spatial 
independence for farmers within a 10 km distance threshold. Similarly, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis for the 3, 5 and 10 nearest neighbors. 
Contrary, the existence spatial independence arising from peer effects 
depends on the selected test and approach. Similar results were obtained 
from the SAR probit models; neighbor effects are significant within an 1% 
statistical significance level and 10% for the peers. The neighbor effects are 
robust to the choice of model, after comparing within results obtained from 
Spatial Durbin Probit models however this was not the case for peer effects.   
Lastly, we find that farmers who experiment and make their own trials of 
seed varieties are less likely to depend exclusively on certified seed. These 
farmers affect their neighbor’s choice of seed channel. With respect to IPRs 
opinions, we find that farmers opinions regarding the royalty collection has 
no impact on their choice of seed channel.  
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6.4 Social networks and member´s participation in 
cooperative governance 
There are numerous ways for cooperative members to participate in the 
governance of the organization.  General assemblies, district councils, boards 
of directors, supervisory councils, advisory councils, nomination committees 
are some of the governing bodies in which the members can actively 
participate provided that their fellow members entrust them with their vote 
and elected them (Bijman et al., 2013; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Bijman 
et al., 2014). The objective of the paper is to investigate underlying 
differences with respect to their social networks between elected and non-
elected representatives as well as their willingness to participate in the 
governance. The relationship between active participation in the governance 
and social networks is examined during a time span of 20 years. This enable 
us to examine the impact of social networks as the economic, political, and 
social conditions change. 
Previous studies have shown that active participation in cooperative 
governance increases in organizations where the culture and values facilitate 
this process and the collective incentives outweigh the individualistic ones 
(Romero and Pérez, 2003; Birchall and Simmons, 2004). Member 
participation is higher among farmers who are emotionally bonded to their 
cooperative (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012) or older farmers who aim to pursue 
a political carrier (Cechin et al., 2013). According to a recent study among 
Swedish farmers, motivational factors such as sense of cooperative 
belongingness and appreciation by other farmers increase farmers’ 
involvement (Morfi et al., 2018). Several other studies examine farmers 
behavior in relation to the their agricultural cooperative (Barraud-Didier et 
al., 2012; Arcas-Lario et al., 2014; Hakelius and Hansson, 2016) but no study 
has been conducted linking social networks to farmers willingness to be 
elected representatives. To do this we break down the impact of farmers 
‘social networks in personal, professional networks as well as the extend of 
influence of social networks on farmer´s involvement in the governance of 
the agricultural cooperative.  
The data used in the analysis covers three distinct time periods; 1993, 
2003 and 2013. Prior to 1995, when the country joined the EU, Swedish 
agriculture was shielded from foreign competition and was at large under 
strict political control. The political climate allowed agricultural 
cooperatives to develop regional monopolies which inevitable weaken 
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domestic competition (Micheletti, 1987). After Sweden´s entrance in the EU, 
the country faced fierce competition from imported food. Domestic 
agricultural cooperatives were forced to lower their prices ending up with 
huge financial loses for their members. The upcoming years, cooperatives 
responded to these new challenges by waves of mergers. During 2003, 
Swedish cooperatives were in a state of flux. By 2013, the number of 
cooperatives has decreased substantially and the agricultural sector was 
transformed to a sector characterized by large-scale units and commercially 
oriented farmers (Nilsson and Lind, 2015). 
To untangle the relationship between social networks characteristics and 
cooperative governance first we distinguish between actual involved in the 
governance and willingness to be involve (potential involvement). For the 
actual involvement the dependent variable is a dummy controlling for 
famer´s experience as elected representatives. We estimate three separate 
logit regressions for each time period. Similarly, three separate ordered 
logistic regression are estimated in order to examine the impact of social 
networks on farmers’ willingness to participate in the governance. The 
unpooled models, were compared with pool models (introducing period 
related interaction terms) in order to test the consistency of the results. Lastly, 
we constructed a factor using factor analysis and performed ANOVA as an 
alternative approach that offers greater visualization of the main findings.  
We find that the impact of personal network is more important than the 
impact of professional network on farmers’ participation in the governance. 
In fact professional networks are only significant to the farmers´ aspiration 
and not for their actual participation in the governance.  The relationship 
between network characteristic and farmers ‘involvement in the government 
is persistent over a period of time when both farmers and cooperatives 
experienced profound changes.  
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Seed is the only physical matter subject to Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
with the ability to duplicate itself. IPRs affect not only the evolution of the 
plant breeding industry but also farmers´ seed choices. Hypothetically, if a 
holder of a smartphone could plant the phone and harvest more smartphones 
in subsequent periods, there would be a series of questions to be asked. Who 
is the owner of the second period smartphones; the tech-phone company who 
invested in the embedded and protected technology or the user? Who decides 
who the owner is? Should the user pay for the use of the second period 
smartphones? Will the user repurchase new smartphones or will she continue 
using the second period phones? Will her peers and neighbors affect her 
choice? This thesis attempts to provide answers to some of these questions 
in the context of seed. 
Results from the thesis show that IPRs create power asymmetry between 
Swedish plant breeders and life sciences multinational corporations. This 
was a major driving force that spiraled waves of mergers and acquisitions. 
The results also indicate that changes in the domestic agricultural policy and 
Sweden’s entrance into the EU have also shaped the evolution of the 
industry; at the beginning of the 1990s the stated reduced the land allocated 
for agricultural production and withdrew the financing from major Swedish 
breeding organizations.  
Another implication of IPRs regards farmers´ right to use farm saved 
seed. Farmers in Sweden are allowed to reuse seed they have formerly 
purchased as long as they pay royalty fees. Historically, farm saved seed 
(FSS) accounts for 20% of the seed used in the production of cereals. To 
understand the factors that influence farmer´s decision to opt for a specific 
seed channel (certified or FFS) a nationwide survey was conducted and 
distributed to every farmer is Sweden with a registered email address to the 
Popular science summary 
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national registry of agricultural firms (Lantbruksregistret). The results show 
that farmers´ assessment of the quality seed in terms of the genetic purity of 
each channel has no impact on their choice while personal relations with their 
seed suppliers and seed processors, investments in the farm as well as 
delivery contracts affect their procurement strategies. Additionally, the 
results of spatial analysis indicate the absence of spatial randomness and 
presence of social learning. This means that farmers learn from each other 
and affect each other regarding the adoption of a certain seed channel.  
Lastly, the thesis investigates the relation between farmers’ social 
networks and active engagement in the governance of their cooperatives. The 
objective of this paper is to investigate underlying differences with respect 
to farmers’ social networks among farmers that have been elected and those 
who haven’t as well as their willingness to participate in the governance. The 
data used in the analysis covers three distinct time periods; 1993, 2003 and 
2013. This made it possible to examine the impact of social networks as the 
economic, political, and social conditions changed. To do this, social 
networks are distinguished between personal and professional networks. The 
results suggest that over time, members have become more willing to be 
elected when they receive backing from their social networks, with personal 
networks being more important than professional networks. The professional 
networks are related only to farmers’ willingness to participate and not to 
their actual participation in governance.  
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